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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2310
________________
KEITH REYNOLDS,
               Appellant
   v.
TROY WILLIAMSON, Warden
___________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-02369)
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 12, 2006
Before:   MCKEE, FUENTES AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed:   September 19, 2006 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Keith Reynolds, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the order of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his habeas corpus
1  The DHO noted that Reynolds’s cell-mate, Chambers, was also partially
responsible.
2
petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he challenged a prison disciplinary
proceeding and requested expungement of his prison record on due process grounds.
This case arises out of the search of Reynolds’s prison cell that he shared with
inmate Chambers in Unit 4B at the United States Penitentiary, Allenwood, Pennsylvania. 
During the cell search conducted on February 17, 2005, a correctional officer removed
the clear plastic-wrapped package from inside the sink drain which contained a 10-inch
sharpened rod with a plastic handle.  Reynolds was charged with possessing a weapon, a
violation of the Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) disciplinary code.
Reynolds was given a timely hearing before the Unit Discipline Committee and
signed the “Inmate Rights Discipline Hearing” form, opting not to have staff
representation or to call witnesses.  After he was advised of his rights at the hearing
before the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO), Reynolds again waived staff
representation and chose to call no witnesses.  Reynolds denied any knowledge of the
weapon, stating that he had no reason to have one.  The DHO reviewed the incident
report, a photograph of the seized weapon, Reynolds’s statement, and cellmate
Chambers’s claim that he had no knowledge of the weapon.  Citing BOP policy which
requires inmates to keep their cells free of any contraband, the DHO determined that the
greater weight of the evidence supported a finding that Reynolds was partially responsible
for possessing the weapon.1  Reynolds received thirty (30) days in disciplinary
3segregation, a six-month loss of commissary privileges, and an additional thirty-days in
disciplinary segregation that was suspended subject to his completion of 180 days of clear
conduct.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Reynolds filed a § 2241 petition
claiming that the DHO’s finding of guilt was based on insufficient and false evidence, in
violation of his due process rights and BOP policy.  He sought expungement of his prison
record.
Upon consideration of the parties’ filings, the District Court held that the prison
complied with due process in notifying Reynolds of his rights in accordance with Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).  The District Court noted that the undisputed
evidence showed that Reynolds was assigned to the cell in Unit 4B at the time of the
search and that the BOP Program Statement 5270.007, Inmate Discipline and Special
Housing Units (January 9, 2003), deemed an inmate responsible for any contraband found
in his cell.  Based on these facts, the District Court ruled that there was “some evidence”
that Reynolds was in constructive possession of the seized weapon, emphasizing that, in
cases where only two people had access to the area in question, the principle of
constructive possession could satisfy the “some evidence” standard.  The District Court
rejected Reynolds’s argument that he was not guilty because BOP policy does not require
him to disassemble cell plumbing in order to comply with keeping his cell free of all
contraband.  Nor did the District Court accept Reynolds’s claim that the DHO lacked
sufficient evidence of guilt absent a finding that Reynolds possessed the necessary
4plumbing tools.  The District Court denied Reynolds’s request for expungement because
Reynolds failed to establish that the information he sought to have expunged was, in fact,
false.  The District Court denied the petition.  Reynolds filed a timely appeal.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  In reviewing a
federal habeas judgment, we exercise plenary review over a district court's legal
conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.  See Rios v.
Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).  Although the issue in Reynolds’s appeal
contains some elements of a factual nature, the inquiry is legal in nature, and we therefore
exercise plenary review over the District Court's conclusions regarding this matter.  Id. 
Upon careful review of the record and of Reynolds’s contentions on appeal, we will
affirm.
First, we must address whether Reynolds may contest his disciplinary sanctions by
means of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  It is well-established that
prison inmates possess a liberty interest in good-time credit.  See Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974).  While the Due Process Clause protects against the
revocation of good-time, it does not provide the same level of protection against the
imposition of other forms of discipline.  See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150-51 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995)).  Here, the DHO
sanctioned Reynolds with disciplinary segregation for thirty days, a suspended term of
thirty days in disciplinary segregation pending his completion of 180 days of clear
conduct, and 6 months’ loss of commissary privileges.  None of these sanctions invokes
5due process protections.  See Torres, 292 F.3d at 150-51.  These punishments cannot be
challenged under § 2241 because in no manner do they affect good time credits, and thus
they have no impact on the fact or length of his sentence or confinement.  See Leamer v.
Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540-42 (3d Cir. 2002).  Accordingly, to the extent that Reynolds
challenges the sanctions imposed, the claim is not cognizable under § 2241.
Reynolds also claims that he has a due process right to have the disciplinary action
expunged from his record because the presence of the alleged false disciplinary finding of
guilt would delay his parole eligibility.  The District Court employed the test for
determining a due process expungement claim set forth in Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1979), and denied the claim.  In Paine, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, in certain limited instances, a state prisoner has a federal due process right to have
“prejudicial erroneous information expunged from [his] prison files” where he shows that:
(1) the information is in his file, (2) the information is false, and (3) the information is
relied upon to a constitutionally significant degree.  595 F.2d at 201-202.  We have not
decided whether to endorse the right of expungement announced in Paine.  Even if we
assume arguendo the due process right exists, we agree with the District Court that
Reynolds is not entitled to relief.
Reynolds argues that the finding of guilt is false because there is no evidence to
support it.  Specifically, he contends that there is no evidence that he possessed the
necessary plumbing tools to retrieve the hidden shank in the sink drain.  In order to
comport with due process, the disciplinary decision had to have support, but only by
6“some” evidence in the record.  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  The
Hill standard is minimal and does not require examination of the entire record, an
independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or even a weighing of the
evidence.  Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 1989).  
We agree with the District Court that some evidence existed to support the DHO’s
conclusions, including the incident report, the fact that Reynolds’s cellmate did not claim
ownership of weapon, and the physical evidence of the seized weapon.  Id. at 564-65;
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.  In the absence of direct evidence indicating
an inmate’s guilt, the “some evidence” standard may be satisfied by application of the
constructive possession doctrine in limited circumstances where a small number of
inmates are potentially guilty of the offense charged.  See White v. Kane, 860 F.Supp.
1075, 1079 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff’d, 52 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 1995).  Here, according to the
disciplinary hearing record upon which the DHO made his determination, the only
prisoners with access to the cell at the time the shank was found were Reynolds and
Chambers.  Both denied knowledge of the shank.  Both were charged.  The District Court
properly denied the claim because Reynolds failed to establish that the information he
sought to have expunged is false.
Reynolds asserts for the first time that fourteen inmates who had occupied the cell
before he and Chambers were housed there could have placed the contraband in the sink
drain.  Consequently, Reynolds argues, the BOP should have searched the cell and seized
the weapon before they let Reynolds and Chambers occupy it.  He also disputes whether
the cell search was “routine,” contending that the officer responsible for the search was
not on duty in Unit 4B.  He did not raise these allegations at any point during the prison
disciplinary proceedings or in his § 2241 petition and thus, we will not consider them on
appeal.
We have thoroughly reviewed the remaining arguments Reynolds makes on appeal
and find them meritless.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
